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ABSTRACT 
‘Trust’ is a concept that has received much attention in studies of informal 
economies which operate in large part outside of formal state regulation. Somali 
trade provides a pertinent case. In Somalia, across Somali East Africa and beyond, 
business has thrived, in spite of – or, some would argue, partially because of – the 
statelessness of the homeland. Beyond scholarly uses, ‘trust’ is also a concept used 
by Somalis themselves to explain their entrepreneurial success. This Working Paper 
asks what the concept of ‘trust’ reveals and conceals about Somali economic life, 
examining the concept in both its etic and emic uses. It does so drawing on 
ethnographic fieldwork in Eastleigh, an estate in Nairobi’s Eastlands, whose 
economy is, in many ways, exemplarily ‘informal’, and driven by Somali enterprise 
and capital investments. We argue that while the concept of ‘trust’ can help explain 
the social relations underpinning trade, and in particular the provision of credit, 
trust is not a prerequisite for acts of trusting in business. Rather, acts of trusting can 
themselves work to produce trust, even though they do not eliminate deceit and 
mistrust in the estate. Trust in its emic usage emerges as a normative rather than 
descriptive discourse that creates a moral impetus for acts of trusting, even as 
‘trusters’ may not necessarily fully trust those they do business with. In Eastleigh, 
an important driver of this discourse is the demand for credit, which itself plays a 
crucial role in driving the estate’s economy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Economic anthropologists and other social scientists have sought to understand 
how so-called informal economies, operating in large part outside of formal state 
regulation, are governed and sustained. ‘Trust’ emerged as a key concept through 
which to elucidate the social underpinnings of economic life, whereby attention was 
paid to the ways personalised forms of trust facilitated business relations in the 
absence of trustworthy state institutions. Somali trade provides a pertinent case. In 
Somalia, across Somali East Africa and beyond, business has thrived. This is in spite 
of – or, some would argue, partially because of – the statelessness of the homeland, 
Peter Little’s (2003) Economy Without State now being a classic on this subject.  
  
This paper asks what the concept of ‘trust’ reveals and conceals about Somali 
economic life. It does so drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Eastleigh, an estate 
in Nairobi’s Eastlands, whose economy is, in many ways, exemplarily ‘informal’ 
and driven in large part by Somali enterprise and capital investments.1 Since the 
early 1990s and the collapse of the Somali state, Eastleigh has transformed from a 
quiet residential suburb into a global economic hub. As hundreds of thousands of 
people fled Somalia, most found shelter in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. A 
significant number, however, found their way to Eastleigh, which had an existing 
Somali presence and influence dating back to the early twentieth century (Carrier 
2016). Eastleigh’s inflated population brought dramatic economic as well as 
demographic change: a booming economy emerged, driven not only by residents’ 
consumption demands but also by Somali enterprise and capital investments. 
Today, shoppers are attracted to the estate from across eastern and central Africa, 
Europe and the US, while extensive trade networks connect traders from as far 
inland as DR Congo with suppliers in China, Malaysia and Dubai. Over forty 
shopping malls have been established in the neighbourhood, while demand for 
accommodation has pushed the construction of multistorey apartment blocks and 
hotels, radically altering the cityscape. Although Somalis have long been associated 
with trade in Kenya and elsewhere, the transformation of Eastleigh has worked to 
cement the reputation of the savvy Somali entrepreneur (Carrier ibid: chapter five).  
 
Eastleigh thus provides an ideal opportunity to observe the uses and usefulness of 
‘trust’ for making sense not only of the workings of informal economies but also, 
more specifically, of the success of Somali economic life. This topic has provoked 
widespread interest. In Kenya, there has been much popular speculation as to what 
lies behind Somali entrepreneurial success and the transformation of Eastleigh. 
Somalis in Kenya have long had an ambivalent relationship with the Kenyan state 
and have been perceived as ‘aliens’ and outsiders who pose threats to national 
security (see Whittaker 2014; Lochery 2012; Carrier 2016). Some commentators have 
too readily linked Eastleigh’s transformation with the laundering of ‘dirty’ money 
and the spoils made through Indian Ocean piracy, or have perceived the estate as a 
hideout for terrorists. But another popular and more positive explanation for 
Eastleigh’s burgeoning economy is that Somalis make such successful 
entrepreneurs because they trust one another. One article in Kenya’s The Standard 
newspaper, for example, proclaimed that ‘the driving force behind Somali traders’ 
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success was ‘trust’ (Masese 2013). Somalis themselves tend to emphasise and 
embrace analyses of Somali trade which put trust and social solidarity at the 
forefront. Indeed, ‘trust’, or aammin in Somali, is not only an etic term used by 
scholars to make sense of the workings of Eastleigh’s economy, but is also a key 
emic term in Eastleigh – a term Somalis themselves use to explain their 
entrepreneurial successes. 
 
In what follows, we examine the potentials and limits of ‘trust’ in elucidating Somali 
economic life, considering the term in both its etic and emic uses. We argue that 
while the concept of ‘trust’ can to some extent explain the social relations 
underpinning trade, and in particular the provision of credit, trust is not a 
prerequisite for trusting behaviour or acts of trusting in business. Rather, acts of 
trusting can themselves work to produce trust, even though they do not eliminate 
deceit and mistrust in the estate. Trust in its emic usage emerges as a normative 
rather than descriptive discourse that creates a moral impetus for acts of trusting, 
even as ‘trusters’ may not necessarily fully trust those they do business with. In 
Eastleigh, an important driver of this discourse is the demand for credit, which itself 
plays a crucial role in driving the estate’s economy.  
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A MASTER CONCEPT 
Trust has historically received a vast amount of attention in the social sciences, 
bringing together diverse disciplinary traditions and interests. Trust has been 
considered the ‘glue’ of society by sociologists such as Simmel (see Möllering 2001), 
the cornerstone of legitimacy and government by political scientists, and the basis 
for economic transactions by economists (Carey 2017: 1). In mainstream economics 
and the management and self-help literature, trust tends to be perceived as a choice 
or strategy for maximising success by rational actors, as with ‘game theory’. This 
rational choice approach tends to be rejected in the sociological and psychological 
literature, whereby trust is understood in less instrumental terms as an affective 
disposition, a psychological state or attitude which in turn determines our 
behaviour and the choices we make (ibid: 5; Jones 1996). As Matthew Carey (2017) 
points out, across these divergent approaches, trust is consistently understood in 
positive terms as an ingredient of broadly-defined social and economic success.  
 
Much of the sociological and political science literature on trust has sought to 
understand the conditions in which trusting affective dispositions or attitudes are 
generated, in turn leading to trusting behaviour. Here, distinctions have been made 
between personalised forms of trust and wider societal or systemic trust (Carey 
2017; Broch-Due & Ystanes 2016). Trust barometers measuring the latter have 
shown distributed societal trust to be advanced in so-called developed countries 
and in particular the Nordic states, and present the view that more trust in a society 
equals more and better development (Broch-Due & Ystanes 2016). This idea 
underpinned Fukuyama’s (1995) thesis that the USA, Japan and other countries 
where there were high levels of generalised trust throughout society were more 
dynamic and successful than the likes of China, where transactions were said to be 
restricted to kin networks in the absence of reliable and trusted state institutions. 
This proved a rather controversial thesis, especially given China’s enormous 
contemporary economic success. 
 
Such distinctions between generalised, systemic trust and personalised trust have 
tended to be underpinned by ideas of modernity. There was a general assumption 
that ‘pre-modern’ societies had little need for ‘trust’ due to their ‘very particular 
mode of social organisation based on ascriptive categories’ (Seligman 1997: 37). In 
this understanding of the ‘pre-modern society’ it was assumed that everybody 
knew their place and role in the society and acted accordingly, thus inspiring 
generalised confidence and harmony. The establishment of formal laws and 
institutions replacing these traditional systems was thought to generate equivalent 
levels of trust. Yet if modernity was seen to be characterised by the birth and 
consolidation of systemic trust, this optimistic view has been undermined by ‘late 
modernity’, globalisation and the changes they have wrought. ‘Trust’ has become a 
master concept (Carrier 2016: 171): in an ‘increasingly disembodied and dislocated 
world’, where ‘risk is the order of the day’, trust is seen as ‘the central social 
technology’ (Carey 2017: 7, original emphasis). 
 
In Africanist anthropology and African studies, ‘trust’ has a longer history. Here, 
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uncertainty and informality are well-established phenomena empirically (see 
Cooper & Pratten 2015; Hart 2015). Keith Hart famously coined the term ‘informal 
economy’ in a paper he presented to the International Labour Organisation in 1971 
on ‘Urban unemployment in Africa’. Drawing on research in urban Ghana, he 
argued that, although large numbers of youth were not formally employed, they 
were nevertheless involved in economic activity and earning an income, albeit on 
an informal basis without contracts or other forms of security associated with the 
formal sector. While the economies of some African countries are characterised by 
informality to a greater degree than others, informalisation became more 
widespread with the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s implemented by the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund in response to economic crises (for example, 
see Overå 2007 on the impact of such reforms on employment in Ghana). The 
reforms’ emphasis on market-driven economic development promoted the cutting 
back of public sector investment leading to a fall in formal public-sector 
employment. The informal economy became crucial to the survival of large swathes 
of the populations of many African countries, including in Somalia prior to the 
collapse of the Barre regime in 1991 (Jamal 1988). 
 
In this context, social scientists researching economic life in Africa (and in other 
settings where informal economies thrive) have sought to understand how such 
economies work, and how they are governed and sustained. ‘Trust’ became a key 
concept through which to make sense of the social relations underpinning informal 
trade, whereby attention was paid to personalised forms of trust in the absence of 
the formal state regulation and institutions that were seen to promote systemic trust 
in the ‘developed’ world. Some investigated the social stuff of trust, examining the 
ties that promote or impede it (see, for example, Ensminger 2001 on trustworthiness 
among Orma in Kenya). Links between trust and kinship have been explored (e.g. 
Cohen 1971, see below), while others focused on other kinds of relationships such 
as friendship, for example Hart’s (1988) work among Frafra migrants in Accra. 
Kinship and friendship are, however, somewhat ambiguous sources of trust. Trust 
is not given through kinship; one may rather be compelled to ‘trust’ a family 
member due to the familial connection even if one does not actually trust them in 
an affective sense. Similarly, liking and being friends with somebody does not 
necessarily mean that one trusts them, as Carey (2017) notes with regard to mistrust 
in the Moroccan High Atlas. 
 
Scholarship on trust in contexts of long-distance trade, including transnational 
economies, moves the analysis of trust beyond the realm of immediate personal 
relations, examining how trust is created between traders in the absence of 
proximity and face-to-face dealings. These studies, in a way, bring the focus back to 
‘systemic trust’, examining the trust that is created through social systems, 
mechanisms, understandings and obligations, even as these may be informal and 
follow unwritten rules. Cohen, for example, showed that Hausa cattle traders in 
Nigeria formed a ‘trading diaspora’ in which shared ‘values, a legal system, kinship 
ties and other forms of social solidarity’ create trust across distance without the use 
of formal contracts (1971: 60). Scholars of transnational networks have emphasised 
the role of ‘bounded solidarity’ in generating trust: a sense of unity among migrants 
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that is heightened in the context of living in an alien setting where people have 
greater dependency on support networks (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993). 
Whitehouse (2012) emphasises how this helps Soninke traders in Congo who have 
little faith in Congolese state institutions. Bounded solidarity creates ‘enforceable 
trust’, a mechanism that ‘discourages wrongdoing by network members, who as 
part of a tightly bounded group must rely on one another for their mutual support 
and livelihoods’ (Rosenfeld 2012: 76). 
 
Enforceable trust brings to the fore the social obligations, pressures and forms of 
control surrounding trust. This obligation lies not only at the community or societal 
level but also between individuals. As Carey notes, ‘trust’ can be seen as a form of 
social control, since by trusting others we attempt to extend our control over them 
by seeking to render their behaviour towards us knowable and predictable (2017: 
7).2 This echoes familiar ideas from classical Maussian approaches to gift-giving, 
whereby the gift bestows the obligation of reciprocity onto the receiver, even as 
what is reciprocated may not be precisely equivalent or within a specified temporal 
frame. Rather than trust being a prerequisite of trusting behaviour or acts of trusting, 
we might see these acts of trusting as themselves generative of trust (Piotr Sztompka 
calls this ‘evocative trust’ [1999: 28]). This is an argument central to Parker Shipton’s 
(2007) work on entrustment among Luo in western Kenya, which argues that acts 
of entrusting objects, money and people do not necessarily hinge on trust but rather 
that these acts produce trust over time. At the same time, entrustment risks deceit 
if the trusted party breaches the trust bestowed upon them and does not fulfil the 
social obligation to reciprocate by being trustworthy.  
 
As we turn to domains which both scholars and our Somali informants identify as 
incubating trust in informal trade, we take forward this focus on entrustment as 
generative (or not in cases of non-reciprocity) of trust. This approach is also inspired 
by a recent edited volume on trust by Broch-Due and Ystanes (2016), which suggests 
that ethnographically-grounded studies of trust might pay attention to acts of 
trusting as opposed to trying to hunt out trust itself. Indeed, if, following Jones 
(1996), we take trust as an ‘affective attitude’, disposition or orientation, trust itself 
can be rather elusive, fluctuating and difficult to pin down.  
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TRUST, CLAN AND BUSINESS 
Trust has proved an enduring theme in Somali studies, particularly in the wake of 
the collapse of the Somali state. Indeed, if state roll-back, growing precarity and risk 
have given rise to the emergence of trust as a master concept, Somalia and Somalis 
provide a particularly compelling case. In a context of heightened uncertainty, kin 
and lineage networks have become not just providers of social support and security 
but also conduits for trade. Unsurprisingly, then, many analyses of Somali social 
and economic life have emphasised the trust emanating from kinship. 
 
The classic Somali segmentary lineage model as described by the grandfather of 
Somali studies, I.M. Lewis, looms large in these studies of Somali trust. Trade is seen 
to operate within structures that emerged out of a nomadic pastoralist context as ‘a 
continuation of the collective economic interests of agnates’ (1994: 126). Goldsmith 
notes that ‘members of the same jilib, sub-clan or sublineage units, retain especially 
strong reciprocal obligations to relatives, even if they are complete strangers who 
might share a common ancestor five or six generations removed (1997: 469). Such 
reciprocal obligations allow strong trade networks to form and provide a 
framework in which trade flourishes; as Bjork’s (2007) study shows, Somalis 
manage transnational capital through clan networks. She emphasises, however, that 
these networks should not be viewed as primordial or as essentially enduring, 
noting that in a context of transnational trade (as indeed any context) they require 
constant work, being produced and reproduced in discourse and practice (ibid: 
152). 
 
In line with some key themes in the literature on trust discussed above, knowability 
and social control are important themes in analyses of the significance of lineage to 
trust among Somalis. According to Simons, genealogy provides a sort of 
information system through which Somalis can quickly and easily gauge the 
trustworthiness of individuals and whether or not to enter into business with them. 
Genealogy charts ‘who has trusted whom in the past and where this has led in terms 
of thicker or thinner, and sustained or broken relationships.’ (1995: 139). Failing to 
be trustworthy has far-reaching implications, not only in terms of the future 
relationship between the ‘trusted’ and the ‘truster’ but within the wider lineage as 
word spreads about an individual’s untrustworthy behaviour and the wider social 
unit’s inability to ensure their proper behaviour. This highlights the ways in which, 
contrary to much of the (Western) theorising on trust, trusting and being trusted are 
not limited to autonomous individuals (cf. Broch-Due & Ystanes 2016).  
 
Trust also features in analyses of some of the key infrastructures that have evolved 
since Somalis migrated across the globe, namely the hawala money transfer 
companies which have facilitated the reproduction of social as well as trading 
networks. The hawala system is said to have evolved through relations of trust, 
whereby one agent could accept money for a client in one location and trust that 
another agent would release the remitted money in another, the remittee often being 
identified through their place in the lineage structure (Cockayne & Shetret 2012). 
Even today, when many hawala are multinational companies with franchises 
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around the world, they are still said to recruit agents through clan networks. As 
Lindley describes: 
 
Money transmitters tend initially to recruit agents through their clan 
networks, which helps ensure loyalty among staff and customers. As a 
former employee in Nairobi put it: “If you go to Kaah, who are working 
there? The Ogaden. And who is working for Amal? The majority is 
Majerteen. And who is working for Dahabshiil? … If you have your own 
business, you bring your cousin, your uncle … members of my family first, 
and then my community. That's our way of helping each other” (Lindley 
2009: 525). 
 
In Eastleigh at the time of Carrier’s research, money was said still to be handed over 
at branches to customers who identify themselves not with ID documents but 
through their lineage. This may be deemed a more effective way of eliciting 
information about somebody, especially where official documents are unreliable or 
unobtainable. In Kenya, Somali refugees often live precarious lives without ID 
documents, as do even some Kenyan Somalis, ID cards notoriously being more 
difficult to obtain for Kenyans from the northern regions (including Kenya’s Somali 
regions) (KHRC 2009: 33–34). Furthermore, an ID document may be fake (see 
Rasmussen & Wafer forthcoming; cf. Cockayne & Shetret 2012: 13), and Somalis’ 
‘who’s who’ knowledge derived through their recalling of lineage and family 
connections may prove a more robust means of identification. In the wake of 
insecurity in Kenya, hawala services have been targeted by the government as 
potential sources of terrorist funding (Mohamed 2015), so there may well be more 
pressure for remittance companies to ensure ID documents are shown and noted, 
as they are for M-Pesa (mobile money) transactions in Kenya.  
 
Between April and June 2015, the Kenyan government banned Somali hawala 
services, claiming that there were links between the money transfer companies and 
the heightened terrorist activity plaguing the country (see Harding 2015). Many 
companies continued their operations in spite of the ban, sending money received 
from abroad on to receivers via M-Pesa. Elliott’s experience of sending money to 
two friends in Kenya – one Somali and one non-Somali – via the money transfer 
company fittingly named Amaana Express (amana means ‘trust’ in Arabic) during 
the period of the ban suggests the continued importance of ethnic identity to trust 
in money transfer. The Somali friend picked up her money on the same day that it 
was sent from Copenhagen, receiving it from a local Amaana agent via M-Pesa. 
There were, however, complications with the transfer of the non-Somali friend’s 
money, which a Somali friend assisting Elliott with the transaction in Copenhagen 
believed was due to their mistrusting her non-Somali and non-Muslim name in the 
context of the ban. It was only after Elliott followed up on the transfer with the 
Amaana agent in Copenhagen (with the help of the Copenhagen-based Somali 
friend) that the money reached its recipient. 
 
‘Trust’ also features in scholars’ and Somalis’ accounts of the lack of formal contracts 
in Somali business dealings, in particular when it comes to the provision of credit. 
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In Eastleigh, doing business without formal contracts is commonplace, though this 
varies from enterprise to enterprise. Some of Eastleigh’s businesses are more 
intertwined with formal systems than others. Banks and larger businesses, for 
example, are integrated into the formal legal system. Eastleigh’s economy appears, 
in some cases, to have pushed state institutions into the margins. The demand for 
real estate led, for example, to the displacement of the estate’s chief’s camp, with his 
office relocated to a converted shipping container: the site had been bought from 
the government and a mall was erected where the office had been (Carrier & 
Lochery 2013: 346). Despite this, Kenyan law does permeate the estate, and Somalis 
living there do refer to it when seeking redress, even if preferring to turn to Sheikhs, 
elders or the Eastleigh Business Association when it comes to business disputes. 
Most of the transactions that take place between wholesalers and retailers and 
which are based on the entrustment of credit are very informal and operate without 
written contracts. A wholesalers’ notebook documenting who has taken what 
advances of stock is often the closest thing one sees to a legally binding record of 
debt.  
 
Personalised relations dominate in this context, and many businesses are connected 
through kin and lineage, as has been found elsewhere. Notions of relatedness 
frequently translate into business enterprises. Notably, those clans of significant 
strength in Eastleigh, such as Ogaden and Garre, are strongly represented in Kenya 
and elsewhere in the diaspora, which provides great opportunities for lineages 
within them to access capital, goods and credit. As with Rosenfeld’s (2012) study of 
the Lebanese diaspora, Eastleigh Somalis have a network of people across the world 
who can generally be trusted to meet obligations and who are aware of the 
consequences for their reputation within that constellation should they renege or 
prove untrustworthy. In this regard, Somalis who build up debts are keen to pay 
them back before their reputation suffers. For some of those traders who have 
struggled to build successful enterprises in Eastleigh, unpaid debts and the negative 
reputation that accompanies them can push them to leave the estate for pastures 
new. This was the case with a trader who moved to South Africa having left his 
debt-ridden shop behind in one of the Eastleigh malls. However, his reputation – 
threatened by the widespread knowledge among Somalis in South Africa of the 
debts he still owed in Kenya – compelled him to return to Nairobi eventually to 
repay these debts. 
 
Given the emphasis on knowability through clan among Somalis, formal written 
contracts may seem inappropriate and almost irrelevant, based as they are on the 
idea of an agreement between autonomous individuals or firms. As noted above, 
trust can hinge on much more extensive social configurations. Contracts can also be 
negatively associated with mistrust; as one young Somali businessman in Eastleigh 
described it, ‘educated folks’ would ‘accept formality’, but older people would be 
more likely to emphasise ‘trust’ and might accuse a potential partner of not trusting 
them if they were to propose a more formal ways of doing business such as through 
written contracts. His comments also point to the association – especially by some 
younger people with business qualifications - of personalised trust based in clan 
and familial connections with ‘backward’, uneducated behaviour in business. The 
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emphasis on trust in Somali business is not seen by all as a boon. 
 
Diaspora Somalis who have become accustomed to business in the West can find it 
hard to navigate the more informal business environment of places like Eastleigh. 
The young Somali businessman quoted above had established a consultancy 
company for such diaspora investors to help them adjust to working without 
contracts. However, it is important to note that Somali business in the West is also 
often guided by informal relations of trust. Samatar (2008), for example, writes 
about a Somali restaurant established in Minneapolis by three partners who each 
put in 35,000 USD but also raised 300,000 USD from twenty other investors. None 
of the investors signed any document stating the nature of their investment or its 
expected return: ‘The investors completely trusted the three partners and believed 
that they would get their money back with a decent return at some point in the 
future’ (ibid: 80). No written partnership or agreement was made between the three 
partners either: ‘Nothing was agreed on paper except to form a partnership and 
manage a restaurant.’ (ibid). 
 
The risk of spoiling one’s reputation through a breach of trust refers back to the 
‘enforceable trust’ discussed above. People can be pressurised through the family 
network to behave appropriately and fulfil obligations, and family members may 
at times step in to resolve, for example, an unpaid debt so as to save the reputation 
of the wider social unit. This is particularly important in an economy such as 
Eastleigh’s, dependent, as participation in it often is, on access to credit. Should one 
family member renege on a debt, this could have implications for another family 
member’s chances of getting credit, since it would mark the family as 
untrustworthy. Being barred from credit could restrict one’s possibilities for trade 
and have serious consequences for the wellbeing of the family in question, thus 
raising the stakes of trust particularly high.  
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TRUST BEYOND CLAN 
I.M. Lewis argued that the effectiveness of lineage for creating trust had a negative 
effect on trusting outside of the kin network, making it extremely hard for Somalis 
to trust non-kin (1961: 30). Relations through the patriline – and relations managed 
through cultural institutions such as the payment of diya (compensation) between 
corporate groups – took centre stage in such a structural-functionalist-type analysis 
that appears to give a primordialist importance to clan and lineage in 
understanding Somali society. Yet this emphasis on trust and clan does not capture 
the more inclusive or far-reaching networks through which Somalis conduct trade 
in Eastleigh. Furthermore, classic accounts of lineage networks have tended to 
emphasise their patriarchal nature, paying little attention to women’s more flexible 
clan identities which facilitate their reciprocal relationships beyond the clan of their 
fathers and husbands (Nori et al. 2006).  
 
In Eastleigh, networks of trust often stretch across clan boundaries, and the estate’s 
boom would not have been possible should enterprise have been restricted to 
lineage and family ties. Ties beyond the lineage and family are, furthermore, created 
through trusting others in trade, including through the entrustment of credit. This 
is evident in the workings of Eastleigh’s camel milk market. At the time of the 
authors’ research, Kenyan Somali middlewomen operating in pastoralist, camel 
milk-producing areas of Kenya such as Isiolo would send milk on credit to other 
Somali women based in Eastleigh, who were often kin but could also be people they 
met during visits to the estate. These Eastleigh-based women operated as 
wholesalers, in turn entrusting milk on credit to women with whom they did not 
have a family relationship, including newly-arrived refugees from Somalia. These 
wholesalers claimed that they knew little about aspiring milk traders other than that 
they were Somalis and Muslims. Trade networks thus expanded beyond the realm 
of family, and trust between traders was also garnered through commercial 
relationships (Elliott 2014), echoing Shipton’s (2007) point that trust may be created 
through acts of entrustment. Larger business enterprises in Eastleigh also transcend 
clan, including some malls that have multi-clan ownership, often based on 
shareholder models. Beyond Eastleigh, Lindley also writes how hawala companies 
need to move beyond narrow clan lines in expanding their business, especially in 
offering services to different parts of the Somali regions (2009: 526). They have 
become multi-clan shareholder companies in the process. Lochery (2015) similarly 
shows that private companies operating in the provision of electricity services in 
Somaliland sought to establish multi-clan shareholder companies so as to broaden 
market access. Transcending clan affiliations is also framed as making better 
business sense by some entrepreneurs in Eastleigh in terms of notions of efficiency, 
competitiveness and quality. As a young Somali entrepreneur involved in 
numerous projects in Eastleigh (and avid reader of the business/self-help literature 
that is so popular in Kenya) put it, what ‘kills’ business is choosing business 
partners on the basis of clan rather than their ‘competitiveness or qualification’. 
 
Furthermore, some business networks in Eastleigh also encompass non-Somalis. In 
some cases, these relationships are facilitated by particular goods. Many Meru 
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living in the estate, for example, are involved in the trade in miraa (or khat, the green 
leaf stimulant popular among Somalis and across the Horn of Africa and Yemen) 
and talked about the opportunities that were opened up to them through forming 
friendships with Somalis in Eastleigh and beyond who might be able to open up 
trading outlets for them elsewhere. It is also common to hear it said by people of 
other ethnic origins in Kenya that Somalis are especially trustworthy in business, 
thus rendering Somalis attractive business partners. The discourse that claims 
Somalis are people to be trusted is thus not only spread by Somalis alone. 
 
It is often high demand for credit that compels Somali wholesalers to entrust goods 
to non-Somali retailers, who can hail from as far away as Tanzania. Giving out credit 
is a way through which wholesalers can keep retailers happy and ensure their 
custom. This logic stretches beyond Somali wholesalers, and those importing goods 
also report receiving large quantities of goods on credit from Chinese firms, keen as 
they are to find an outlet for their stock. Credit also enables goods to move quickly, 
which is particularly important when it comes to perishables like khat and milk. 
Fast movement is also a principle underpinning the trade of other goods, such as 
the vast quantities of cheap, low-quality clothing in the estate (see Carrier & Elliott 
forthcoming). Many Somali traders talk about a principle of keeping goods moving 
through the ready provision of credit as one that differentiates a Somali business 
model from, say, a Kenyan Asian one, and point to this in explaining the success of 
Somali business in contrast to that of these competitors. ‘Trust’ is particularly 
important for this business model in terms of the provision of credit. Indeed, ‘trust’ 
could be criticised for disguising the impetus for both giving and receiving credit 
in Eastleigh and the role it plays in oiling the estate’s economy. Without ‘trust’, 
credit would not be given, and Eastleigh’s economy would not be nearly so 
dynamic.  
 
However, ‘trust’ should not be seen as merely a cover or disguise for credit. As with 
Luo entrustment (Shipton 2007), a Somali model of entrusting credit generates trust 
and builds social relations rather than those relations being a precursor or 
determinant of credit. Sztompka (1999) writes about this as ‘evocative trust’ – by 
trusting someone we create trust. A similar point is made by Haas (2016), whose 
research among Barga Mongols shows that trust is considered a sign that one is 
trying to produce positive effects in the world. Even when dealing with people who 
are known to be untrustworthy, Haas found that her informants endeavoured to 
behave in trusting ways towards them. In Eastleigh, acts of trusting are propelled 
by a moral economic principle: in addition to promoting trade and the generation 
of wealth for individual entrepreneurs, trusting ensures that trade and money-
making opportunities circulate and are inclusive, allowing diverse actors to 
participate in Eastleigh’s economy. This was expressed by camel milk wholesalers, 
who explained that it was a social responsibility to give milk on credit to poor 
refugee women so as to enable them to find their feet in Eastleigh’s economy and 
generate an income. This principle of participation also has a ‘what goes around 
comes around’ logic. As one member of the Eastleigh Business Association put it, 
as a wholesaler, entrusting credit to a new retailer not only promotes their wealth 
and success but also one’s own. After some time, that customer may be wealthy, 
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and every week will pay you good money. Through that initial act of trusting, he 
went on, the customer may even become wealthier than the wholesaler.3  
 
Thus, it is not only kinship and lineage but also the mutuality that emerges from 
other kinds of relationships, often facilitated by acts of entrusting credit, which 
incubate trust in Eastleigh. More mundanely, trusting can also be encouraged by 
very concrete conditions; for Mohaa, a Kenyan Somali from Isiolo, it was renting a 
shop in a large Eastleigh shopping mall from which to do his retail business in men’s 
clothing that meant that wholesalers began to be more confident and generous in 
their credit provisions. Still, Mohaa’s path to obtaining the shop was initially carved 
out through his family connections: 
 
After earlier attempts at making a living in Nairobi had met with little 
success, a relative helped him settle in Eastleigh, providing him with 
accommodation and 100 shillings each day. Mohaa describes how he 
impressed the relative one time when he was left in charge of his shop. In 
his absence, Mohaa’s sales charisma led to many sales, and he was given 300 
shillings, and, more importantly, a job in the shop in 2006. He worked there 
until 2008 when his relative moved to Norway after marrying a woman from 
Kakuma refugee camp with resettlement rights. In showing that anaanimika 
(‘he can be trusted’) both to be honest and effective in sales, Mohaa could 
build up networks capable of advancing him goods on credit, essential when 
an opportunity came for him and his one-time business partner – whom he 
had befriended as they worked in neighbouring shops – to obtain their own 
shop in the same mall when its previous occupier moved to South Africa in 
2008. They still needed to raise the capital for the ‘goodwill’ payment to 
secure the shop, however, and had to raise 100,000 shillings each. Here, their 
experience of working in the malls no doubt loosened the purse strings of 
their relatives who could see they would work hard in the business. They 
both were loaned the money by family, Mohaa by his father (a man of some 
means and influence in Isiolo), and his business partner by a brother, 
allowing them to start their shop known as Nasiib Fashions. 
 
While it was trust garnered through Mohaa’s and his partner’s family relations that 
led them to obtain the shop, the shop itself further generated trusting relations 
between them and those wholesalers with whom he did not have a familial relation. 
Having a shop in the Eastleigh economy is a sign of permanence and means, and a 
material sign of trustworthiness. Indeed, without successful navigation of informal 
relations of credit and debt, themselves generative of trust as we have argued, it 
would be very hard to have a shop, and these relations come to be symbolised by 
the shop itself.  
 
We now turn to a more metaphysical dimension of trusting upon which informants 
placed particular emphasis – Islam.  
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TRUST AND ISLAM 
Both the Kiswahili and Somali words for ‘trust’ derive from the Arabic amana which 
refers to the fulfilment of trust. The term connects with wider Islamic values which 
have long been present in and shaped economic life in Eastleigh but appear to be 
getting stronger. Many of our informants spoke about the importance not so much 
of a shared Somali identity to generating trust in business relations but to shared 
Muslim faith.  
 
Islam has long featured prominently in trade. The spread of Islam across Africa and 
elsewhere can be linked to the spread of commercial networks through Muslim 
traders, and Cohen long ago emphasised the link between Hausa trade and Islam 
in West Africa (1969). The Prophet Mohamed himself engaged in trade, and the 
morality of Islam links to the morality of business and making money. In Eastleigh 
and elsewhere in Kenya where Islamic influences are dominant, people debate what 
are halal and haram ways of making money. Economic success and religious piety 
are seen as mutually reinforcing, so that those who make money through halal 
means will be successful, whereas wealth generated through haram practices is 
fragile and short-lived (see Elliott 2018).  
 
Debates on halal and haram wealth are well-rehearsed in Eastleigh and guide its 
economy. Mosques will not accept donations from people whose money is believed 
to be ill-gotten: for example, there are stories circulating of mosques refusing 
donations from prominent khat traders. There is also criticism from religious 
authorities of the financing model through which many malls in the estate have 
been built – that is, through upfront payments of large sums required to reserve 
shops, as described in the story of Mohaa’s pathway to renting a shop above. Paying 
such sums is known as ‘buying the key’, and such payments are known as 
‘goodwill’. ‘Goodwill’ is a well-known business term for the intangible assets of a 
going concern, but in Kenya refers to money paid on top of rent in order to gain the 
rights to run a business in the shop. In Eastleigh, malls are often funded through 
such payments: after obtaining the rights to develop a plot, a company will 
advertise retail space within the future mall and request that those interested 
reserve shops through such payments. As a mall might have hundreds of such 
shops, and goodwill fees can be from $5,000–50,000 depending on the size of the 
shop, huge sums can be raised to pay for construction and an early profit. Those 
who obtain the rights to shops in this way will often in future sub-let to others, 
charging their own goodwill in the process. There is much resentment and 
bitterness surrounding such payments in Eastleigh and in the wider Kenyan 
economy, seen as they often are as additional burdens to rent and to raise the bar 
for entering into shop-based trade. In Eastleigh, some see these payments as 
immoral and un-Islamic, believing them to be similar to interest or riba in Arabic in 
that they make money out of the exploitation of others.  
 
While goodwill has been a key business model through which to finance mall 
construction projects, many proprietors of Eastleigh’s more recent malls have 
rejected this model. Traders in one of the larger malls built initially through such 
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payments talked of their expectations (and hopes) that the mall’s management 
would do away with goodwill payments in the future via the influence of Islamic 
preachers. The names of some of Eastleigh’s more recently-built malls – Madina 
Mall, Mecca Plaza – attest to this championing of Islamic values in business, and the 
owners of these malls (built through a shareholder rather than the goodwill model) 
were keen to differentiate them from the latter through their Islamic business 
credentials. A revitalised commitment to halal ways of conducting business has also 
led to the promotion of Islamic financial products in Eastleigh; the Islamic insurance 
company, Takaful, for example, has established a branch in the estate. While 
insurance, seen as akin to gambling, is considered haram in Islamic teachings, with 
Takaful losses and gains are said to be shared equally between company and client. 
Many in Eastleigh prefer to bank with hawala money agents rather than with banks, 
but a growing number of Sharia-compliant financial products promoted by banks 
such as the Gulf African Bank might provide a more formal institutional basis for 
trusting. 
 
Islam also underpins more personalised trade relations, particularly with the spread 
of Salafist forms of Islam in Eastleigh which seems to owe much to influences from 
abroad. Aisha Ahmad’s (2012) work on Islam and trade in Mogadishu throws light 
on the shift from trade based on clan and lineage to one on based on Islamic 
principles. In the wake of state collapse, businesses came to depend on tight, clan-
based networks as trust between clans and sub-clans disintegrated and numerous 
businesspeople were able to do well out of clan conflict, especially with the flow of 
aid money into the country. When aid money dried up in the mid-1990s with the 
withdrawal of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), Mogadishu’s 
business community grew increasingly sensitive to the negative impact of tribalism 
on their business concerns. Increasingly, businesspeople turned to Islamic 
principles instead. This discursive shift followed the more pragmatic solutions that 
the Islamic Courts offered: they promised an overarching security provision where 
the clan warlords and militias, in contrast, were fragmented, predatory and 
unreliable, not to say expensive (Ahmad 2015). Emphasising the importance of 
Islam to business in this context became a means of bolstering a more universal 
Islamic identity over more limiting clan identities which had begun to have negative 
connotations in local discourse. A similar discursive shift has been noted among 
Somalis in the diaspora. Tiilikainen, for example, writes that ‘if Somalia carries an 
image of continuous war, refugees, misery, and the haven of terrorists, Islam as a 
global religion instead represents dignity, respect and morality’ (2003: 65). 
 
In Eastleigh, too, Islamic identity garners trust and Eastleigh Somalis would often 
more readily refer to Islamic faith as a basis for trust than to Somali ethnicity and 
clan. Companies often look to reputed sheikhs to promote their business and give 
them the seal of approval. The manager of Takaful’s Eastleigh branch, for example, 
talked about looking to sheikhs to promote the service and thus recruit clients. 
Shared Islamic identity has likewise promoted the extension of Eastleigh Somalis’ 
trading relations, enabling links between Somalis and Gulf traders, as Ahmad (2012) 
finds for traders in Mogadishu. Dubai has for decades been a crucial source of goods 
for Eastleigh, and Eastleigh traders rely on the strong relations Somalis have built 
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up over the years with Dubai’s business community (who often sponsor permits for 
Somalis [Abdi 2015: 74ff]). Kenyan Somalis also depend on Gulf contacts as buyers 
for Kenyan and Somali livestock. In all this trade, shared Islam no doubt helps foster 
trust. Some (formerly Christian) Meru in Eastleigh have converted to Islam and 
talked about the ways this improved their prospects of trade with Somalis. This is 
not to make a materialist analysis in which religious affiliation functions entirely to 
accomplish material ends, although some commentators in Kenya are ready to draw 
that conclusion (e.g. Dahir 2012). Rather, it is to note the intertwining of economic 
and religious life, even as it is often assumed (particularly in Western thought) that 
they should operate separately. Ahmad (2012) points to the way the enactment of 
religious piety among businesspeople in Mogadishu becomes internalised, so that 
performing piety produces piety. Following the notion of ‘evocative trust’ cited 
above (Sztompka 1999), performing trust through acts of trusting or entrustment 
has a similar effect, producing substantive trust over time.  
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THE RISK OF TRUSTING 
Somalis’ claims that they trust one another stand in stark contrast to the suspicion, 
mistrust and conflict that have pervaded everyday life in Somalia’s recent history. 
Eastleigh itself is hardly deceit-free; those navigating its economy must be savvy 
and alert to scams which can result in significant losses. Indeed, many in Eastleigh 
emphasise that the need to show oneself as trustworthy relates to the fact that there 
are many who are not (cf. Shipton 2007). In this context, maintaining a good 
reputation becomes ever more important. This is well-exemplified in one story told 
by Mohaa, the Kenyan Somali shopkeeper whom we met earlier. Mohaa recounted 
an incident that he and his friends refer to as Operation Linda Duka (‘Operation 
Protect the Shop’), named after Operation Linda Nchi (‘Operation Protect the 
Nation’), the name for the Kenya Defence Force’s 2011 military incursion into 
Somalia (see Crisis Group 2012):  
 
A young man and acquaintance of Mohaa’s from his hometown of Isiolo had 
moved to Eastleigh in search of work, and Mohaa had given him some work 
at his shop. He had worked hard initially, bringing in good profits, but then 
he started giving Mohaa less money, and Mohaa began to suspect that he 
was keeping some of the proceeds for himself. The young man’s explanation 
for the decline in profits was that he was only able to sell items at the lowest 
price. Thus, Mohaa set up a ‘sting’ operation so as to catch his assistant out 
should he be up to no good. He gave a Sudanese woman 10,000 shillings and 
told her to buy shirts and trousers. When she had done her ‘shopping’ and 
Mohaa returned and asked his assistant how much he had sold that day, he 
was told that he had only made a small profit. Mohaa then revealed that he 
knew how much he had in fact made, and the young man was given the sack 
and returned to Isiolo. 
 
There are many other such examples of deceit in Eastleigh which give rise to 
mistrust. For all the talk of Somalis fearing loss of reputation and thus being 
compelled to be trustworthy, it is not hard to find stories of those who attract 
investors in business schemes only to ‘take the money and run’. One camel milk 
trader, Saida, who was now based in the estate, formerly operated from Isiolo, 
sending milk to trading partners in the city. She described an experience in which a 
trading partner, whom she had initially met while visiting Eastleigh and to whom 
she had subsequently begun sending milk on credit, had left to go and live in a 
refugee camp, taking the proceeds from their business with her. After this, Saida 
decided to move to Eastleigh where she could better oversee the business, feeling 
she could no longer risk entrusting milk on credit from afar. In Eastleigh there is 
also mistrust and suspicion surrounding plot dispute cases, ubiquitous as they are 
in Kenya, between different groups of Somalis. One informant was defrauded of a 
deposit he put down for an apartment in a residential block in the estate that was 
never built, and turned to the Kenyan legal system to try to resolve his case. 
Diaspora investors are seen as particularly naïve and vulnerable to deceit, especially 
if, as mentioned above, they have become used to formal systems of business 
elsewhere in Europe and North America and are less attuned to spotting the risks 
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of trusting. The consequences of such naivety are well exemplified in the story of 
Abdul, a US-based Somali who had saved up a good deal of money through 
working as a taxi driver in Chicago. He had managed to purchase a much-sought-
after taxi ‘medallion’ required to operate a taxi business in the USA for 50,000 USD. 
These medallions are limited in number but demand for them is high and their 
prices have soared, meaning that Abdul was later able to sell his for 250,000 USD. It 
was this money that he decided to invest in a business in Nairobi, joining a cousin 
who lived there in his business trading sugar. This is a commodity that has become 
a mainstay of Somali trade: cheap supplies from Brazil enter Kenya illegally via 
Kismayu in Somalia and are then traded in northern Kenyan markets (see 
Rasmussen 2017). But Abdul ended up being swindled: the cousin gave him a fake 
cheque after a business deal and ran off to South Africa with much of Abdul’s hard-
earned savings. Again, trust may be spoken of so much in Eastleigh precisely 
because the costs of its lack are so well known (cf. Shipton 2007).  
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CONCLUSION: TALKING TRUST 
Scholars of informal economies have warned that explaining transactions through 
the notion of trust can work to mask asymmetrical relations; as Sayer puts it, ‘what 
appears to indicate trust may be largely a consequence of domination, or simple 
mutual dependency’ (2001: 699). In Eastleigh and the broader transnational field in 
which it is located, people often have little choice but to trust, especially when it 
comes to engaging in trading relations with those with whom they share clan or 
lineage. Furthermore, despite all the talk that ‘we Somalis trust each other’, some 
are better placed to be trusted than others. Networks of trust are not always 
accessible to less powerful clans, a point that was made by a representative of the 
Somali Bantu population in Eastleigh at a workshop in Nairobi in 2014 where we 
presented a version of this paper.  
 
Indeed, and following the discussion on the risks of trusting above, trust in its emic 
usage also has its limits. The narrative that ‘we Somalis trust each other’, along with 
the one claiming that ‘we kin/fellow clan/lineage members trust each other’ and ‘we 
Muslims trust each other’, is an idealised one, and buying into it uncritically would 
make running a successful business in Eastleigh virtually impossible. Trust is more 
of a normative than a descriptive discourse. It works to create a moral code which, 
ideally at least, promotes mutuality in trade. Every time trust is emphasised in 
Eastleigh, the message is further spread that being trustworthy is the correct way to 
behave, and that one should be prepared to entrust goods and capital to someone 
else – especially if they are Somali. The same applies to the emphasis on proper 
Islamic behaviour in trade, as discussed above. These discourses lubricate the flow 
of capital and goods, reassuring budding traders that plenty of people have trusted 
before and that rich rewards can be reaped through doing so. For those worried 
about lack of legal recourse, the claim that ‘we Somalis don’t use contracts’ might 
well be reassuring. Requesting a contract might be deemed evidence of one’s lack 
of trust and perhaps even an unwillingness to trust, thus souring relations between 
potential business partners. This is in a context where, as mentioned, ‘trust’ creates 
openings in trading opportunities and renders business more inclusive. A 
reluctance to trust might, then, be deemed selfish, especially in relation to the 
provision of credit which ensures the circulation of money and the possibility for 
aspiring traders to participate in Eastleigh’s economy. Many, then, find themselves 
compelled to trust, not only in order to pursue success in Eastleigh’s vibrant 
economy but also so as to be considered someone who is acting appropriately 
within it.  
 
A narrative of ‘trust’ might conceal important aspects of the workings of Eastleigh’s 
economy as outlined above, but it nevertheless has very real effects on the way 
business is done. As with Shipton’s (2007) argument about entrustment, social 
obligation – or pressure to engage in acts of trusting – helps to promote trusting 
relations, even as ‘trusters’ like Mohaa, Saida and Abdul may find themselves 
getting burned from time to time along the way. In this respect ‘trust’ is not merely 
discursive, but also produces real-world effects, including trust itself.  
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Of course, all the talk of trust in Eastleigh is also designed for an external audience. 
At the time of our research, when much state and popular suspicion surrounded 
the estate, many Eastleigh traders were keen to debunk claims that their success 
was attributable to dodgy dealings. They were also keen to distance themselves 
from the clan identities which many associate with the collapse of ‘normal’ life in 
Somalia and with the subsequent exile in Kenya. In this way, the narrative of trust 
serves a wider purpose beyond business and trade in building a unifying vision of 
what Somali society should be – a narrative that counters common depictions of 
Somalia as a conflict-ridden place of little trust, replacing it with a narrative of 
Somalinimo (Somali unity) and Islamic morality. While scholars, ourselves included, 
have sought to use trust as a concept to elucidate the workings of informal 
economies, Eastleigh’s Somalis have seized upon ‘trust’ to account for the dynamics 
of their own social and economic life. 
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END NOTES 
1 This research was conducted as part of Carrier’s project ’Diaspora, Trade and Trust: 
Eastleigh, Nairobi’s Little Mogadishu’ between 2011 and 2012 and Elliott’s project on 
Eastleigh’s camel milk market in 2011. We gratefully acknowledge the Oxford Diasporas 
Programme, the Leverhulme Trust and the British Institute in Eastern Africa for their 
financial support.  
2 For Carey, mistrust conversely ‘contributes…to a philosophy of rugged autonomy and 
moral equality that assumes others to be both free and fundamentally uncontrollable’ (2017: 
10). 
3 Such principles of inclusivity are also found in micro-credit, namely the saving and lending 
clubs that are so popular across the continent (see, for example, James 2014 on savings clubs 
in South Africa).  
 
